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Economics has been under fire since the recent crisis for enshrining abstract models that 
offer little connection to the real world.  In “Growth in a Time of Debt,” our data-
intensive approach aims at providing stylized facts, well beyond selective anecdotal 
evidence, on the contemporaneous link between debt, growth, and inflation at a time in 
which the world wealthiest economies are confronting a peacetime surge in public debt 
not seen since the Great Depression of 1930s, and indeed virtually never in peacetime.  
As Paul Krugman (2009) observed, “they’ll (the economists) have to do their best to 
incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics.”  One might add as a 
corollary, however, that such discipline is especially needed when those realities are 
inconvenient to strongly-held opinions. 
 
In a recent paper, we studied economic growth and inflation at different levels of 
government and external debt.1  The public discussion of our empirical strategy and 
results has been somewhat muddled.  Here, we attempt to clarify matters, particularly 
with respect sample coverage (our evidence encompasses forty-four countries over two 
centuries--not just the United States), debt-growth causality (our book emphasizes the bi-
directional nature of the relationship), as well as nonlinearities in the debt-growth 
connection and thresholds evident in the data (absolutely central points that seem to have 
been lost in some commentary.) 
In addition to clarifying the earlier results, this paper enriches our original 
analysis by providing further discussion of the high debt (over 90 percent of GDP) 
episodes and their incidence.  Some of the implications of our analysis, including for the 
United States, are taken up in the final section.  
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 Carmen M. Reinhart and  Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” (2010a). American Economic 
Review, Vol. 100 No. 2, May, 573-78.  
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We begin by re-iterating some of the main results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a).  
The careful reader of our earlier paper can skip to section 2. 
1. The basic exercise and key results 
Our analysis was based on newly-compiled data on forty-four countries spanning 
about two hundred years.  This amounts to 3,700 annual observations and covers a wide 
range of political systems, institutions, exchange rate arrangements, and historic 
circumstances.  
The main findings of that study are:   
First, the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for 
debt/GDP ratios below 90 percent of GDP.2  Above the threshold of 90 percent, median 
growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more.  The 
threshold for public debt is similar in advanced and emerging economies and apply for 
both the post World War II period and as far back as the data permit (often well into the 
1800s).  
Second, emerging markets face lower thresholds for total external debt (public 
and private)—which is usually denominated in a foreign currency.  When total external 
debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines about two percent; for higher 
levels, growth rates are roughly cut in half.   
Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public 
debt levels for the advanced countries as a group (some countries, such as the United 
                                                     
2
 In this paper “public debt” refers to gross central government debt.  “Domestic public debt” is 
government debt issued under domestic legal jurisdiction.  Public debt does not include obligations 
carrying a government guarantee.  Total gross external debt includes the external debts of all branches of 
government as well as private debt that issued by domestic private entities under a foreign jurisdiction. 
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States, have experienced higher inflation when debt/GDP is high.)  The story is entirely 
different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases. 
Figure 1, from RR (2010a), can be used to summarize our main conclusions as 
they apply to the twenty advanced countries in our forty-four country sample.   We will 
concentrate here on the advanced countries as where much of the public debate is 
centered.3 
In the figure, the annual observations are grouped into four categories, according 
to the ratio of debt-to GDP during that particular year:  years when debt-to-GDP levels 
were below 30 percent; 30 to 60 percent; 60 to 90 percent; and above 90 percent. 4 The 
bars show average and median GDP growth for each of the four debt categories.  Note 
that of the 1,186 annual observations, there are a significant number in each category, 
including 96 above 90 percent.  (Recent observations in that top bracket come from 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Japan.)  From the figure, it is evident that there is no obvious 
link between debt and growth until public debt exceeds the 90 percent threshold.  The 
observations with debt to GDP over 90 percent have median growth roughly 1 percent 
lower than the lower debt burden groups and mean levels of growth almost 4 percent 
lower. (Using lagged debt does not dramatically change the picture.) The line in Figure 1 
plots the median inflation for the different debt groupings—which makes plain that there 
is no apparent pattern of simultaneous rising inflation and debt.  
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 The comparable emerging market exercises are presented in the original paper. 
4
 The four “buckets” encompassing low, medium-low, medium-high, and high debt levels are based on our 
interpretation of much of the literature and policy discussion on what are considered low, high etc. debt 
levels. It parallels the World Bank country groupings according to four income groups. Sensitivity analysis 
involving a different set of debt cutoffs merits exploration, as do country-specific debt thresholds along the 
broad lines discussed in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). 
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Figure 1. Government Debt, Growth, and Inflation:  Selected Advanced Economies, 
1946-2009 
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Notes:  Central government debt includes domestic and external public debts. The 20 advanced economies 
included are Australia. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  The number of observations for the four debt groups are:  443 for debt/GDP below 30%; 
442 for debt/GDP 30 to 60%; 199 observations for debt/GDP 60 to 90%; and 96 for debt/GDP above 90%.  
There are 1,180 observations.  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a) and sources cited therein. 
 
2. High debt episodes in the sample 
The episodes that attract our interest are those where debt levels were historically 
high.  As convenient as it is to focus exclusively on a particular country or a single 
episode for a single country (like the U.S. around World War II, where the data is readily 
available or an interesting ongoing case, like Japan), the basis for an empirical regularity 
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is multiple observations.   Because our data span 44 countries with many going back to 
the 1800s or (at least the beginning of the 19th century), our analysis is based on all the 
episodes of high (above 90 percent) debt for the post World War II period; for the pre-
war sample it covers all those that are encompassed by the availability of data.  Table 1 is 
reproduced from RR (2010a) and describes the coverage and the basic statistics for the 
various debt levels for the advanced economies.5   
It is common knowledge that the United States emerged after World War II with a 
very high debt level.  But this also held for Australia, Canada, and most markedly the 
United Kingdom, where public/debt GDP peaked at near 240 percent in 1948.  These 
cases from the aftermath of World War II are joined in our sample by a number of 
peacetime high-debt episodes: the 1920s and 1980s to the present in Belgium, the 1920s 
in France, Greece in the 1920s, 1930s and 1990s to the present, Ireland in the 1980s, Italy 
in the 1990s, Spain at the turn of the last century, the U.K. in the interwar period and 
prior to the 1860s and, of course, Japan in the past decade.   As will be discussed, 
episodes where debt is above 90 percent are themselves rare and as shown in Table 1, a 
number of countries have never had debt entries above 90 percent.  
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 The interested reader is referred to the original paper for the comparable emerging market table. 
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Table 1. Real GDP Growth as the Level of Government Debt Varies:  
Selected Advanced Economies, 1790-2009 
(annual percent change) 
  Central (Federal) government debt/ GDP 
Country Period Below 30 
percent 
30 to 60 
percent 
60 to 90 
percent 
90 percent and 
above 
Australia 1902-2009 3.1 4.1 2.3 4.6 
Austria 1880-2009 4.3 3.0 2.3 n.a. 
Belgium 1835-2009 3.0 2.6 2.1 3.3 
Canada 1925-2009 2.0 4.5 3.0 2.2 
Denmark 1880-2009 3.1 1.7 2.4 n.a. 
Finland 1913-2009 3.2 3.0 4.3 1.9 
France 1880-2009 4.9 2.7 2.8 2.3 
Germany 1880-2009 3.6 0.9 n.a. n.a. 
Greece 1884-2009 4.0 0.3 4.8 2.5 
Ireland 1949-2009 4.4 4.5 4.0 2.4 
Italy 1880-2009 5.4 4.9 1.9 0.7 
Japan 1885-2009 4.9 3.7 3.9 0.7 
Netherlands 1880-2009 4.0 2.8 2.4 2.0 
New Zealand 1932-2009 2.5 2.9 3.9 3.6 
Norway 1880-2009 2.9 4.4 n.a. n.a. 
Portugal 1851-2009 4.8 2.5 1.4 n.a. 
Spain 1850-2009 1.6 3.3 1.3 2.2 
Sweden 1880-2009 2.9 2.9 2.7 n.a. 
United Kingdom 1830-2009 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.8 
United States 1790-2009 4.0 3.4 3.3 -1.8 
Average 3.7 3.0 3.4 1.7 
Median 3.9 3.1 2.8 1.9 
Number of observations = 2,317 866 654 445 352 
     
Notes: An n.a. denotes no observations were recorded for that particular debt range.  There are missing 
observations, most notably during World War I and II years; further details are provided in the data 
appendices to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and are available from the authors. Minimum and maximum 
values for each debt range are shown in bolded italics. 
Sources: There are many sources, among the more prominent are: International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global Development Finance.  Extensive other sources are cited 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
 
3. Debt thresholds and nonlinearities: the 90 percent benchmark 
 
 Thresholds and non-linearities play a key role in understanding the relationship 
between debt and growth that should not be ignored in casual re-interpretations. 
 
(i) Thresholds. Anyone who has done any work with data is well aware that 
mapping a vague concept, such as “high debt” or  or “over-valued” exchange rates to a 
workable definition for interpreting the existing facts and informing the discussion 
requires making arbitrary judgments about where to draw lines.  In the case of debt, we 
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worked with four buckets 0-30, 30-60, 60-90, and over 90 percent.  The last one turned 
out to be the critical one for detecting a difference in growth performance, so we single it 
out for discussion here.   
Figure 2 shows a histogram of public debt-to-GDP as well as pooled descriptive 
statistics (inset) for the advanced economies (to compliment the country-specific ones 
shown in Table 1)  over the post World War II period.6 The median public debt/GDP 
ratio is 36.4; about 92 percent of the observations fall below the 90 percent threshold. In 
effect, about 76 percent of the observations were below the 60 percent Maastricht criteria.  
Put differently, our “high vulnerability” region for lower growth (the area under the curve 
to the right of the 90 percent line) comprises only about 8 percent of the sample 
population. The standard considerations about type I and type II errors apply here.7 If we 
raise the upper bucket cutoff much above 90 percent, then we are relegating the high-debt 
analysis to case studies (the UK in 1946-1950 and Japan in recent years).  Only about two 
percent of the observations are at debt-GDP levels at or above 120 percent—and that 
includes the aforementioned cases.   
If debt levels above 90 percent are indeed as benign as some suggest, one might 
have expected to see a higher incidence of these over the long course of history.  
Certainly our read of the evidence, as underscored by the central theme of our 2009 book, 
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 Our sample includes 24 emerging market countries. 
7
 The null hypothesis is whatever “normal” growth is versus the alternative of lower growth. 
 8 
Figure 2. The 90 percent debt/GDP threshold: 1946-2009, Advanced economies 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2010a). 
Notes: The advanced economy sample is the complete IMF grouping (Switzerland and Iceland were 
added).  It includes Australia. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
,the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
hardly suggests that politicians are universally too cautious in accumulating high debt 
levels.  Quite the contrary, far too often they take undue risks with debt buildups, relying 
implicitly perhaps on the fact these risks often take a very long time to materialize. If 
debt to GDP levels over 90 percent are so benign, then generations of politicians must 
have been overlooking proverbial money on the street.  
We do not pretend to argue that growth will be normal at 89 percent and subpar 
(about one percent lower) at 91 percent debt/GDP any more than a car crash is unlikely at 
54mph and near certain at 56mph.  However, mapping the theoretical notion of 
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“vulnerability regions” to bad outcomes by necessity involves defining thresholds, just as 
traffic signs in the U.S. specify 55mph. 8 
(ii) Nonlinear relationship.  We summarized the results in our paper by writing:  
“the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP 
ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP.  Above 90 percent, median growth rates 
fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more.”  RR (2010a) 
Revisiting Figure 1 is useful for illustrating the importance of nonlinearities in the debt-
growth link.  Simply put, for 92 percent of the observations in our sample there is no 
systematic link between debt and growth.9  Thus, if one were to do a simple scatterplot of 
all the observations on debt/GDP and on growth one would expect to find a “clouded 
mess.”  We can highlight this general point with the U.S. case.  As noted in the working 
paper version of RR (2010a), for the period 1790-2009, there are a total of 216 
observations of which 211 (or 98 percent) are below the 90 percent debt to GDP cutoff.10  
It should be quite obvious, that a scatter plot of the U.S. data would not be capable 
of revealing a systematic pattern (as demonstrated in the work Iron and Bivens, 2010.) 
Indeed, this example illustrates one of our main results, that there is no systematic 
relationship between debt and growth below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP.  
4. Debt and growth causality 
As discussed, we examine average and median growth and inflation rates 
contemporaneously with debt. Temporal causality tests are not part of the analysis.  The 
application of many of the standard methods for establishing temporal precedence is 
                                                     
8
 These methodology issues are discussed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  
 
9
 Bruno and Easterly (1998) find similar nonlinearities in the inflation-growth relationship. 
10
 Figure 3 in the NBER WP is not included in the published version of the paper. 
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complicated by the nonlinear relationship between growth and debt (more of this to 
follow) that we have alluded to.  
But where do we place the evidence on causality?  For low-to-moderate levels of 
debt there may or may not be one; the issue is an empirical one, which merits study.  For 
high levels of debt the evidence points to bi-directional causality.   
Growth- to debt:  Our analysis of the aftermath of financial crisis RR (2008) presents 
compelling evidence for both advanced and emerging markets  over 1800-2008 on the 
fiscal impacts (revenue, deficits, debts, and sovereign credit ratings) of the recessions 
associated with banking crises; see Figure 3. 
  As we sum up, 
“Banking crises weaken fiscal positions, with government revenues invariably contracting.  
Three years after a crisis central government debt increases by about 86 percent.  The fiscal 
burden of banking crisis extends beyond the cost of the bailouts.”  Reinhart and Rogoff  
(2008).11 
There is little room to doubt  that severe economic downturns, irrespective 
whether their origins was a financial crisis or not, will, in most instances, lead to higher 
debt/GDP levels contemporaneously and or with a lag. There is, of course, a vast 
literature on cyclically-adjusted fiscal deficits making exactly this point. 
                                                     
11
 See Section IV devoted to fiscal consequences in Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008), 
“Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace,” NBER Working Paper No. 14587, December see also 
Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
 11 
Figure 3. Cumulative Increase in Public debt in the Three Years Following the Banking Crisis 
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Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
Debt-to-growth:  A unilateral causal pattern from growth to debt, however, does not 
accord with the evidence.  Public debt surges are associated with a higher incidence of 
debt crises.12  This temporal pattern is analyzed in RR (2010b) and in the accompanying 
country-by-country analyses cited therein.13 In the current context, even a cursory reading 
of the recent turmoil in Greece and other European countries can be importantly traced to 
the adverse impacts of high levels of government debt (or potentially guaranteed debt) on 
county risk and economic outcomes.  At a very basic level, a high public debt burden 
implies higher future taxes (inflation is also a tax) or lower future government spending, 
if the government is expected to repay its debts. 
There is scant evidence to suggest that high debt has little impact on growth.  
Kumar and Woo (2010) highlight in their cross-country findings that debt levels have 
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 For a model where credit-financed government deficits lead to a currency crisis, see Krugman (1979).  
13
 RR (2010b).  
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negative consequences for subsequent growth, even after controlling for other standard 
determinants in growth equations.  For emerging markets, an older literature on the debt 
overhang of the 1980s frequently addresses this theme. 
5. Implications and U.S. policy  
 One need look no further than the stubbornly high unemployment rates in the 
United States and other advanced economies to be convinced how important it is to 
develop a better understanding of the growth prospects for the decade ahead.  We have 
presented evidence, (in a multi-country sample spanning about two centuries), suggesting 
that high levels of debt dampen growth.   One can argue that the United States can 
tolerate higher levels of debt than other countries without having its solvency called into 
question.  That is probably so.14  We have shown in our earlier work that a country’s 
credit history plays a prominent role in determining what levels of debt it can sustain 
without landing on a sovereign debt crisis.   More to the point of this paper, however, we 
have no comparable evidence yet to suggest that the consequences of higher debt levels 
for growth will be different for the U.S than for other advanced economies. It is an issue 
yet to be explored.   
 Figure 4, which plots total (public and private) credit market debt outstanding for 
the United States during 1916 to 2010:Q1 makes this point plain.15   Despite considerable 
deleveraging by the private financial sector, total debt remains near its historic high in 
2008.  Total public sector debt during the first quarter of 2010 is 117 percent of GDP; 
since 1916 (when this series begins).  It has only been higher during a one-year stint at 
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 Indeed, this is the central argument in Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) originally published in November 
17, 2008. 
15
 Flow of Funds aggregate the private and public sectors, where the latter is comprised of federal (net), 
state and local and government enterprises.  To reiterate, this is not the public debt measure used in our 
historical analysis, which is gross central government debt (which for the U.S. is at present about 90 
percent of GDP). 
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119 percent in 1945.  Perhaps soaring U.S. debt levels will not prove to be a drag on 
growth in the decades to come.  However, if history is any guide, that is a risky 
proposition and over-reliance on U.S. exceptionalism may only prove to be one more 
example of the “This Time is Different” syndrome.16 
 For many if not most advanced countries, dismissing debt concerns at this time is 
tantamount to ignoring the proverbial elephant in the room. 
Figure 4. Total (Public and Private) Credit Market Debt Outstanding:  
United States, 1916-2010Q1 
Median 117.4 61.5
Max 282.9 2008 119.2 1946
Min 35.9 1946 11.5 1916
2010:Q1 234.8 117.4
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Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States, Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. 
Notes: Beginning in 2010:Q1, almost all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools are consolidated in 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s balance sheets and, thus, are included in the debt of government 
enterprises. 
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 The “This Time is Different Syndrome” is rooted in the firmly-held beliefs that: (i) Financial crises and 
negative outcomes are something that happen to other people in other countries at other times (these do not 
happen here and now to us);(ii) we are doing things better, we are smarter, we have learned from the past 
mistakes; (iii) as a consequence, old rules of valuation are not thought to apply any longer. 
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